Barsa walla Barsakh

I'm starting a series of blogs written by current students on the MSc Violence, Conflict and Development. The blog is an assignment in the first term, and I will post here all the blogs that gained distinction marks to share a bit of our work at SOAS and to give these ideas an airing!

This first blog is by Ameé Thwaites

Barsa walla Barsakh

As I bid farewell to friends at the fishing port in Joal, a small Senegalese fishing village, it seemed I wasn’t the only one leaving. A large wooden boat was launching, packed not with nets but with people; young men, women and the occasional child, wearing hoods, jeans and backpacks. ‘Barsa walla barsakh’, ‘Barcelona or die’, my host Dad muttered. Previously unbeknownst to me, I was hearing an oft-repeated mantra among Senegalese communities and witnessing the at-all-costs attitude it represents of those willing to travel from Senegal to Europe to seek economic prosperity, security, and more.

In contrast with Senegal’s reputation as a regional political and economic success story, Senegal ranks among the top 10 nations of origin for irregular sea crossings to Europe. Migration peaked in 2016 with 10,378 known Senegalese successfully making the journey, despite ever-increasing risks; most migrants pass through transit countries Libya and Morocco to cross the Mediterranean in unreliable dinghies and boats. Their futures in Europe are uncertain; working in unregulated labour markets, vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, poverty, and modern-day slavery.

Who are those who risk leaving a country without war or widespread violence, with constant economic growth and democratic political system, to embark on uncertain lives in the undocumented, unregulated shadow of European society? The truth is that Senegal’s economy, life expectancy and governance don’t tell the full story. In many regions desertification threatens agriculture, illegal practices by foreign corporations threaten local fishing, high remittances mask food security issues, and a high reproduction rate has created a youth bulge, for which educational and labour provisions are insufficient. The impact of government plans for economic and social regeneration is yet to be felt.



Numerous EU policy papers have sought to produce targeted policy recommendations preventing irregular migration to Europe. As a result, €60 million has been funnelled into development in Senegal, focusing on improving economic and employment opportunities mostly through vocational training and agricultural enterprise. Effects on migration is unclear, though the projects indicate inadequate understanding of the Senegalese context; decision-making, who migrates and why, and the extent of the impact of job losses in the fishing and agriculture industries. This seems to suggest the is EU inappropriately applying neo-classical migration theory to the Senegalese contexts, targeting young jobless men whose choice to migrate is assumed to be based solely on their individual level of prosperity and assessment of relative benefit and cost. The reality is much more complex; deep-rooted and multi-layered motivations for migration are economic but also include a range of dynamic individual and collective macro and micro political, economic and social factors across demographic groups.



New economics of migration theory, incorporating extended human capital theory of migration, recognises this complexity, widening the neo-classical approach to focus on Senegalese migrants’ families and households. Their decision-making process assesses perceived market conditions at origin versus destination, and their response to push and pull factors. Push factors include perceptions of migration as a ‘rite of passage’ for young men in particular, but also a process promising a unique mark of success and prestige irrespective of gender. Social capital at destination is a major pull factor – familial or social, but often for the Senegalese, religious. Decisions to migrate reflect the levels of relative deprivation and risk-aversion/minimisation of entire extended households, religious groups and their responses to the variety of factors.



In addition to development, the EU is working with transit countries including Libya and Morocco, investing hundreds of millions of euros in border and maritime security, seemingly with limited accountability mechanisms against unethical practices. The result is legitimised use of tactics including tow-backs, detention, abuse and harm of migrants, and systematic human rights violations including denial of access to asylum procedures, human trafficking, kidnapping and slavery.



A recent ODI paper suggested that normative migration policies of deterrence is unlikely to reduce numbers or protect migrants, but force evermore irregular and risky routes. The EU has failed to acknowledge this, refusing to expand legal pathways and focusing exclusively on containing preventing migrants’ arrival in the EU. A MAFE study found that holders of European permits are more than twice as likely to return to Senegal than those undocumented. This carries potentially important policy implications, breaking down the assumption that widening legal entry channels would lead to overwhelming numbers settling permanently in the EU, suggesting they might support more circular migration. Such urge challenges to normative reasoning to improve culture and rhetoric around EU responses to irregular migration. The EU must recognise that it is not always possible to change people’s minds about migrating, however it is possible to reduce loss of life, disrupt smuggling networks, and integrate migrants into societies.



The upcoming Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in Morocco aims to facilitate greater legal migration, protect human rights and national sovereignty, and help countries manage migration better. Discourse around the compact encourages global governments and institutions to fundamentally rethink migration policy and acknowledge critical shortcomings of outsourcing border control and asylum processing to problematic transit countries. It aspires to replace these with human rights-compliant, migrant-centred policies providing safe, legal migration pathways, and addressing the real root causes of migration where possible.

Despite EU and member states’ consensus for active support for the compact, important stakeholders including Italy have already withdrawn. The future potential for real change in EU migration policy thus looks uncertain. As right-wing populist movements gain momentum and other issues take up EU airtime, the fate of Senegalese migrants making their way north rests on an increasingly uncertain future. With effective management mechanisms at the EU level, migration could well be recognised as a source of prosperity rather than perceived as a burden. The compact represents a unique opportunity to establish a global framework to safeguard migrants’ lives and human rights, which is not yet lost. It will take real willpower on the part of the remaining governmental stakeholders to capitalise on the chance the compact offers to implement a step-change in EU attitudes and policy around migration.