by Fabrizio Farina
Political violence has been surging in Nigeria since COVID-19 made its first appearance on February 27, 2020. As the pandemic sweeps away the country's precarious health care system, Boko Haram is exploiting the escalation of regional chaos to initiate its resurgence in the Borno State. The group's targeting of civilians and aid workers resurfaces memories of the DRC, when in 2018-19 the ADF mobilized Ebola as a tool for conflict, expanding its operations and securing local authority. Though, the nature of conflict in Nigeria is undergoing a metastasis as terror is becoming increasingly digitalized - differentiating it from the DRC's experience.
Boko Haram is using technology to disseminate misinformation and counter-narratives regarding COVID-19, hindering governmental efforts to mitigate the pandemic. The intersection of violence in the physical and digital plane is allowing Boko Haram to engage in asymmetric warfare, and may catalyze a technical change in the way conflict is conducted by non-state actors.
In addition to dragging Nigeria in a battle on two fronts, Boko Haram's capitalization of the pandemic is likely to transcend violence into a continuum as the health crisis and security threat fuel a negative feedback loop of chronic fragility. This vicious cycle will deepen Nigeria's socio economic fissures as horizontal inequalities between the North and South worsen, significantly obstructing regional development.
COVID-19 and the Impetus of Violence: An Ongoing Struggle
Nigeria - despite ranking 3rd on the Global Terrorism Index in 2019 - enjoyed a relative decline in terrorism fatalities since 2014. This offered the state breathing room to devise a strategy aimed at defeating Boko Haram, who was forced to retreat in Northern Nigeria following counter-insurgency measures. However, the government was caught by surprise as rising insecurity from COVID-19 pressured it to divert resources towards public health, ordering soldiers to enforce lockdown regulations. On March 23 Boko Haram exploited this instability by organizing an ambush that killed 47 Nigerian soldiers and wounded another 15.
Violence escalated as government forces were stretched to prevent the expansion of Boko Haram throughout Lake Chad and in Southern Nigeria. Very quickly, civilians became the group's primary target. Nigeria's poor State Fragility Index aids our understanding of how pre existing socio-economic grievances, detrimental institutions and a deep mistrust in the government rendered civilians vulnerable to political violence.
Such violence has been characterized by a serious effort to undermine the government and deteriorate the already dwindling social contract, rather than garnering communal support - albeit popularity was never Boko Haram's forte.
On April 15 Abubakar Shekau - Boko Haram's leader - publicly condemned COVID-19 measures as an attack against Islam and on Muslims. Reframing Nigeria's response to the pandemic as violent in itself propagated non-compliance amongst civilians. In turn this has escalated structural violence on behalf of the state as the police and military resorted to using force to ensure civilians followed state regulations.
The spread of propaganda and cyberwarfare is not a new strategy for Boko Haram. However, this approach becomes unique as it coalesces with another external source of instability - the virus.
Boko Haram is synchronously utilizing the pandemic and digital platforms as tools to perpetrate and reproduce violence. It is diminishing COVID-19's threat, destabilizing state order and consequently exposing individuals to multiple risks. Should the situation degenerate further, Nigeria may slide into a context of perpetual violence as civilians become increasingly vulnerable to the ripple effects of Boko Haram's attacks and COVID-19.
How likely is this to happen? Only time will tell. More data explaining the root causes of - and relationship between - the increase in violent conflict by non-state actors and COVID-19 is needed for a calculated analysis. Until then, my analysis on Nigeria's struggle remains speculative in nature; but Mozambique's experience with the pandemic may offer some insight.
Food insecurity, state repression and police violence have all intensified since Mozambique's first case of coronavirus in mid-March. The health crisis triggered a domino effect of instability by fuelling pre-existing socio-economic and political tensions. So much so that individuals now perceive police violence to be a greater source of insecurity than criminality. It is thus imperative to avoid examining the pandemic in absolute terms. The insecurity brought by COVID-19 is not restricted to the virus itself, but permeates in different facets of life.
Eerily similar to Mozambique's case, that of Nigeria is reflecting the same trend. Once the dust settles, the question of post-crisis reconstruction arises. Given how violent conflict and development are inversely related, the devolution of the former into a continuum is having devastating effects on the latter.
The Perilous Path Towards (re)-Development
Even prior to the pandemic Boko Haram was inhibiting Nigeria's economic growth, shaving 0.82 per cent off national GDP per annum. Nonetheless, some indices of development were improving. Notably the country was consistently reducing economic inequality. With the introduction of COVID-19, Nigeria is experiencing an unsustainable fiscal drain. As Boko Haram attacks intensify, the state is adopting a Band-Aid fix which is struggling to mitigate the short term effects.
What Nigeria really needs is a medium to long-term strategy to minimize the extent of the now inevitable developmental regression. However, the pre-existing context of political instability and state corruption, as well as weak and exclusionary institutions render it unfeasible for Nigeria to pursue this endeavor alone. It requires external aid.
On April 28 the IMF approved US$3.4 billion in financial aid to support Nigeria's financial necessities during the emergency. While cushioning the short-term economic damage, it will do little to change Nigeria's structural and institutional fragility. Ultimately, these are the characteristics which have historically handicapped local growth. COVID-19 and Boko Haram merely exemplified the precarity of the state.
As the West shifts its focus inward - itself preoccupied with the pandemic - Nigeria must prepare for a post-COVID environment. To do this, it must first cater to the social insecurities of civilians: food supplies, protection against Boko Haram, and aid distribution. Equally important is the desperate need to devise an economic strategy that fosters local productivity to prevent a regression of economic inequality. Albeit this is easier said than done.
The case of Nigeria represents a unique intersection of violence, and sparked a technical change in the perpetration of conflict by non-state actors. Therein lies a pressing need to reframe the synergy between health and security in contexts of terrorism, and re-evaluate the function of technology as a medium for terrorist networks to increase their scope through cyberwarfare.
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